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SEFFERT v. Los ANGELES TRANSIT LINES
[L. A. No. 26201.

In Bank.

[56 C.2d

Aug. 17, 1961.]

YETTA SEFFERT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOS
ANGELES TRANSIT LINES et aI., Defendants and
Appellants.
[1] Negligence -

\

Res Ipsa Loquitur - Prerequisites. - Superior
knowledge by defendant is not a prerequisite for application
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
[21 ld.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limitations of Doctrine.-Plaintiff's
participation in the events leading to an accident does not preclude application of res ipsa loquitur if there is evidence that
her negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the
accident.
[3] Carriers-Passengers-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In
an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when the doors
of the bus she was attempting to enter suddenly closed and
the bus started, dragging her some distance and then throwing
her to the pavement, that part of an instruction on res ipsa
loquitur stating that defendant must present evidence to show
either a satisfactory explanation of the accident in which there
is no negligence on the part of defendant, or such care on
defendant's part as leads to the conclusion that the accident
did not happen because of want of care by him, but was due
to some other cause although the exact cause lllay be unknown,
was not objectionable as shifting the burden of proof by requiring defendants to prove that they were not negligent where,
when read as a whole, the instructions correctly stated the
law that if defendants were to prevail they must rebut the
res ipsa loquitur inference with evidence of as convincing force.
[4] ld. - Passengers - Instructions - Res Ipsa Loquitur. - In an
action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when the doors of the
bus she was attempting to enter suddenly closed and the bus
started, dragging her some distance and then throwing her to
the pavement, the court did not err in failing to caution the
jury that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine can be invoked only
if the jury finds that the incident occurred as claimed by
plaintiff and that plaintiff's negligence was not a contributory
proximate cause, where defendant did not request such a

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 307 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 295 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 59 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 133; [2] Negligence,
§ 135; [3, 4] Carriers, § 151; [5] Witnesses, § 43; [6, 11) Damages, § 100; [7] Damages, § 86; [8-10] Damages, § 87; (12) Appeal
and Error, §§ 195, 1089.
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cautionary instruction and the subject was covered by other
instructions that res ipsa loquitur applies "if and only in the
event" the jury should find that plaintiff was a passenger,
.that plaintiff was not a passenger unless she entered the bus
when it was reasonably prudent to do so, and that the jury
should return a verdict for defendant if it found that plaintiff
was contributively negligent.
Witnesses-Infanta-Exam;nation.-!n an action for injuries
sustained by plaintiff while attempting to board a bus, the
court did not commit prejudicial misconduct in conducting the
examination of a 9-year-old witness where, because of her
tender years, the court conducted the initial examination, and,
in a sympathetic, impartial and commendable manner, elicited
relevant testimony, and nearly all of the court's questions
were asked without objection and defendants were given full
opportunity to cross-examine.
Damages-Excessive Damages-Damages Held Not Excessive.
-An award of $187,903.75 to a 42-year-old passenger injured
when boarding an autobus was not excessive where she was
single, had been self-J;upporting for 20 years, the main
arteries and nerves to her left foot were completely severed
at the ankle, the main blood vessel supplying blood to that
foot had to be tied off, with the result that there was permanent stoppage of the main blood source, the heel and shin
bones were fractured, the injuries were extremely painful
and resulted in a permanently raised left heel, the foot was
not only permanently deformed but had a persistent open
ulcer on the beel, plaintiff bad undergone nine operations
since tbe accident involving skin grafting and other painful
procedures, bad difficulty standing after returning to work
and had to lie down frequently, and there was substantial
evidence to support plaintiff's estimate that ber total pecuniary
loss, past and future, amounted to $53,903.75, and her claim
for pain and suO"l'ring-, PllRt and future, amounted to $134,000.
Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by 'l'rial
Court.-The amount of damages is a fact question, first committed to the discretion of the jury and next to tbe discretion
of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. Since tbey see
and hear the witnesses and frequently see the injury and impairment that has resulted, all presumptions are in favor of
the decision of the trial court.
Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by Appellate Courts.-An appellate court can interfere on the ground
that a judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience

[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 227.
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and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part
of the jury.
r91 Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by Appellate Courts. - There are no fixed or absolute standards by
, which an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the
extent of the damages suffered by plaintiff as a result of defendant's wrongful act, its duty being to uphold the jury and
trial judge whenever possible. The amount to be awarded is
a matter on'which there legitimately may be a wide difference
of opinion, and in considering a contention that the damages
are excessive the appellate court must determine every conflict
in respondent's favor and give him the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the record.
[10] Id.-Excessive Damages-Consideration of Question by Appellate Courts.-While an appellate court should consider the
amounts of damages awarded in prior cases for similar injuries, each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Injuries are seldom identical and the amount
of pain and suffering involved in similar physical injuries
varies widely. Basically, the question that should be decided
by appellate courts is whether or not the verdict is so out of
line with reason that it shocks the conscience and necessarily
implies that the verdict must have been the result of passion
and prejudice.
[11] Id. - Excessive Damages - Damages Held Not Excessive. Where the nonpecuniary items of damage suffered by a 42-yearold passenger when boarding an autobus included allowances
for pain and suffering, past and future, humiliation as a result
of being disfigured and being permanently crippled, and constant anxiety and fear that the leg would have to be amputated, the $134,000 award for such items, though high and
perhaps more than the Supreme Court would bave awarded
were it the trier of the facts, was not as a matter of law su
high as to shock the conscience and give rise to the presumption
that it was the result of passion or prejudice on the part of
the jurors.
[12] Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel: Waiver of Right to
Urge Error. - Alleged prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's
counsel in arguing to the jury in a personal injury case that
damages for pain and suffering could be fixed by means of a
mathematical formula predicated on a per diem allowance for
such item of damages could not be raised on appeal where
defendants' counsel did not object, -assign the argument as
misconduct or ask that the jury be admonished to disregard
it, and where defendants' counsel, by also adopting a mathematical formula type of argument, must be deemed to have
waived the right to urge such error.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Alfred Gitelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while attempting to board defendants' bus. Judgment for
plaintiff affirmed.
Harry M. Hunt and David S. Smith for Defendants and
Appellants.
Irving H. Green, Wright, Wright, Goldwater & Mack,
John H. Rice and Andrew J . Weisz· for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PETERS, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for
plaintiff for $187,903.75 entered on a jury verdict. Their
motion for a new trial for errors of law and excessiveness of
damages was denied.
At the trial plaintiff contended that she was properly entering defendants' bus when the doors closed suddenly catching her right hand and left foot. The bus started, dragged her
some distance, and then threw her to the pavement. Defendants contended that the injury resulted from plaintiff's
own negligence, that she was late for work and either ran
into the side of the bus after the doors had closed or ran
after the bus and attempted to enter after the doors had nearly
closed.
The evidence supports plaintiff's version of the facts. Several eyewitnesses testified that plaintiff started to board the
bus while it was standing with the doors wide open. Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. They do
contend, however, that prejudicial errors were committed
during the trial and that the verdict is excessive.
There Was no Prejudicial Error on the
Issue of Liability
Defendants contend that the court erred in giving instructions on res ipsa loquitur on the ground that the doctrine is
inapplicable when, as in this case, the defendant does not
possess superior knowledge concerning the accident or when,
as in this case, the plaintiff plays an active part in the events
leading to it. There is no merit in this contention. [1 J Superior knowledge by the defendant is not a prerequisite for
the application of the doctrine. (Lec! v. Union Pac. R.R. 00.,
25 Cal.2d 605, 619-620 [155 P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008]; see
)
!
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Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Oalifornia, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 183,
202-204.) [2 ] Nor does participation by the plaintiff in the
events leading to the accident preclude its application if there>
is evidence that plaintiff's negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the accident. (Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines,
.. 50 Ca1.2d 153, 157 [323 P.2d 391]; Zentz v. Ooca Oola Bottling
00., 39 Ca1.2d 436, 444 [247 P.2d 344] ; see Fleming, Torts,
299.)
[3] Defendants contend that the instruction on res ipsa
loquitur erroneously shifted the burden of proof by requiring
them to prove that they were not negligent. The instruction
stated that if and only if plaintiff was a passenger as defined
by prior instructions then "from the happening of the acci·
dent . . . an inference arises that a proximate cause of the
occurrence was some negligent conduct on the part of defendant. That inference is a form of evidence 1 and unless
there is contrary evidence sufficient to meet or balance it,
the jury should find in accordance with the inference . . . .
In order to meet or balance the inference of negligence, the
defendant must present evidence to show either (1) a satisfactory explanation of the accident, in which there is no 'IIeglige'llce on the part of defendant, or (2) such care on the defendant's part as leads to the conclusion that the accident
did not happen because of tvant of care by him, but was due
to some other cause, although the exact cause may be unknown.
If such evidence has at least as much convincing force as the
inference and other evidence, if any, supporting the inference,
then you will find against the plaintiff on that issue. " (Italics
added.)
Defendants quote the italicized part of the foregoing instruction out of context to support their contention that the
instruction shifted the burden of proof. Read as a whole
the instructions correctly state the law of California that if
defendants are to prevail they must rebut the res ipsa loquitur
inference with evidence of as convincing force. (Hardin v.
San Jose Oity Lines, Inc., 41 Ca1.2d 432, 437 [260 P.2d 63] ;
Burr v. Sherwin Williams 00.,42 Ca1.2d 682, 691 [268 P.2d
1041]; Williams v. Oity of Long Beach, 42 Ca1.2d 716, 718
[268 P.2d 1061].)
[ 4] Defendants also contend that the court erred in
failing to caution the jury tllat the doctrine can be invoked
'CI. Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 457, 465 [126 P.2d 868]; McBame,
IfilereflDeB, Are They E'llidence, 31 Cal.L.Rev. 108, 112.
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only if the jury finds that the incident occurred as claimed
by plainti1f and that plainti1f's negligence was not a contributory proximate cause. (Hardin v. San Jose Oity Lines, Inc.,
BtLpra,41 Cal.2d 432, 435.) Defendants did not request such
a cautionary instruction. Moreover the subject was covered
by other instructions.
The court instructed the jury that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies "if and only in the event" the jury should
find that plaintiff was a passenger. Under the court's definition plaintiff was not a passenger unless she entered the
bus when it was reasonably prudent to do SO.2 In effect the
instruction stated that the doctrine did not apply if the jury
believed that the accident happened as defendants contended.
Furthermore, the jury was instructed to return a verdict for
defendants if it found that plainti1f was contributively negligent. There is, therefore, implied in the verdict a finding that
the accident occurred as described by plainti1f rather than as
described by defendants.
[Ii] There is no merit in defendants' contention that the
court committed prejudicial misconduct in conducting the
examination of a 9-year-old witness. Because of her tender
years the court conducted the initial examination, and, in a
sympathetic, impartial, and commendable manner, elicited
relevant testimony. Nearly all of the court's questions were
asked without objection and defendants were given full opportunity to cross-examine.
None of the other claimed errors on the issue of liability,
all minor in nature, bas merit.
8rJ.'he court stated that the paBsenger relationship WaB established
"when: (1) a person who intends in good faith and is prepared to be·
eome a paB8enger, has arrived at a place, which has been designated
by custom or notice of the carrier aB a site from which the earrier will
take on passengers, and (2), the person stands alongside or ncar the
probable stopping place of the bus, or approaches and goes toward and
arrives close to the entrance doors of the bus standing at the site to
receive paBsengers, or otherwise had indieated to the bus driver her
intention to board the bus; and (8), the bus driver takes or has taken
lome action which indicates the immediate acceptance by the carrier of
such person as a passenger, and in this respect the stopping by a bus
driver of a bus of a carrier, at a site, as site is hereinbefore defined, for
the purpose of taking on passengers and the opening by the bus driver
of the entrance doors of the bus to receive IUch persons indicates the
willingness, intention and readiness of the carrier to accept such person
as a passenger; and (8) [sic] when it being reasonably prudent 80 to do
the person makes her first contact with the bus in the act of entering it
or in any event when she gains entrance to the bus.••• "
(Italics
added.) It is not necessary to decide whether the foregoing instruction
defines a passenger too narrowly, for any error in this respect favors
defendant&.

)
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The Damages Were Not Excessive
[6] One of the major contentions of defendants is that
the damages are excessive. as a matter of law. There is no
merit to this contention .
. The evidence most favorable to the plaintifi shows that
prior to the accident plaintiff was in good health, and had
suffered no prior serious injuries. She was single, and had
been self-supporting for 20 of her 42 years. The accident
happened on October 11, 1957. The trial took place in July
and August of 1959.
As already pointed out, the injury occurred when plaintiff
was caught in the doors of defendants' bus when it started
up before she had gained full entry. As a result she was
dragged for some distance. The record is uncontradicted that
her injuries were serious, painful, disabling and permanent.
The major injuries were to plaintiff's left foot. The main
arteries and nerves leading to that foot, and the posterior
tibial vessels and nerve of that foot, were completely severed
at the ankle. The main blood vessel which supplies blood to
that foot had to be tied off, with the result that there is a
permanent stoppage of the main blood source. The heel and
shin bones were fractured. There were deep lacerations and
an avulsion' which involved the skin and soft tissue of the
entire foot.
These injuries were extremely painful. They have resulted
in a permanently raised left heel, which is two inches above
the floor level, caused by the contraction of the ankle joint
capsule. Plaintifi is crippled and will suffer pain for life.'
Although this pain could, perhaps, be alleviated by an operative fusion of the ankle, the doctors considered and rejected
this procedure because the area has been deprived of its
normal blood supply. The foot is not only permanently deformed but has a persistent open ulcer on the heel, there
being a continuous drainage from the entire area. Medical
care of this foot and ankle is to be reasonably expected for
the remainder of plaintiff's life.
Since the accident, and because of it, plaintifi has undergone nine operations and has spent eight months in various
hospitals and rehabilitation centers. These operations involved
painful skin grafting and other painful procedures. One ineDe1lDed in Webster'. New International Dictionary (Sd ed.) as •
•• tearing asunder; forcible .eparation."
"Her lite upectanc,. 11'88 34.9 ,.earl from the time of trial.

)
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volved the surgical removal of gangrenous skin leaving painful raw and open :flesh exposed from the heel to the toe.
Another involved a left lumbar sympathectomy in which
plaintiff's abdomen was entered to sever the nerves affecting
the remaining blood vessels of the left leg in order to force
those blood vessels to remain open at all times to the maximum
extent. Still another operation involved a cross leg :flap graft
of skin and tissue from plaintiff's thigh which required that
her left foot be brought up to her right thigh and held at
this painful angle, motionless, and in a cast for a month until
the :flap of skin and fat, partially removed from her thigh,
but still nourished there by a skin connection, could be
grafted to the bottom of her foot, and until the host site could
develop enough blood vessels to support it. Several future
operations of this nature may be necessary. One result of this
operation was to leave a defective area of the thigh where the
normal fat is missing and the muscles exposed, and the local
nerves are missing. This condition is permanent and disfiguring.
Another operation called a d~bridement, was required. This
involved removal of many small muscles of the foot, much
of the fat beneath the skin, cleaning the end of the severed
nerve, and tying off the severed vein and artery.
The ulcer on the heel is probably permanent, and there is
the constant and real danger that osteomyelitis may develop
if the infection extends into the bone. If this happens the
heel bone would have to be removed surgically and perhaps
the entire foot amputated.
Although plaintiff has gone back to work, she testified that
Rhe has difficulty standing, walking or even sitting, and must
lie down frequently; that the leg is still very painful; that
she can, even on her best days, walk not over three blocks
and that very slowly; that her back hurts from walking;
that she is tired and weak; that her sleep is disturbed; that
she has frequent spasms in which the leg shakes uncontrollably; that she feels depressed and unhappy, and suffers
humiliation and embarrassment.
Plaintiff claims that there is evidence that her total pecuniary loss, past and future, amounts to $53,903.75. This was the
figure used by plaintiff's counsel in his argument to the jury,
in which he also claimed $134,000 for pain and suffering, past
and future. Since the verdict was exactly the total of these
two estimates, it is reasonable to assume that the jury accepted
the amount proposed by counsel for each item. (Braddock v

)
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Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. (Fla., 1955), 80 So.2d 662,
665.)
The summary of plaintUf as to pecuniary loss, past and
future, is as follows:
.Doctor and Hospital Bills ..••..••..• $10,330.50
Drugs and other medical expenses
stipulated to in the amount of. . • . . . 2,273.25
Loss of earnings from time of
accident to time of trial........... 5,500.00 $18,103.75
Future Medical Expenses:
$2,000 per year for next 10 years. . .. 20,000.00
$200 per year for the 24 years
thereafter ........••..•.•..•... 4,800.00
Drugs for 34 years............... 1,000.00 25,800.00
43,903.75
10,000.00
Possible future loss of earnings ••••••
$53,903.75
Total Pecuniary Loss •••••••••••••••
There is substantial evidence to support these estimates. The
amounts for past doctor and hospital bills, for the cost of
drugs, and for a past loss of earnings, were either stipulated
to, evidence was offered on, or is a simple matter of calculation.
These items totaled $18,103.75. While the amount of $25,800
estimated as the cost of future medical expense, for loss of
future earnings and for the future cost of drugs, may seem
high, there was substantial evidence that future medical
expense is certain to be high. There is also substantial evidence
that plaintiff's future earning capacity may be substantially
impaired by reason of the injury. The amounts estimated for
t hose various items are not out of line, and find support in
the evidence.
This leaves the amount of $134,000 presumably allowed for
the nonpecuniary items of damage, including pain and su1fering, past and future. It is this allowance that defendants
seriously attack as being excessive as a matter of law.
It must be remembered that the jury fixed these damages,
and that the trial judge denied a motion for new trial, one
ground of which was excessiveness of the award. These determinations are entitled to great weight. [7] The amount
of damages is a fact question, first committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the discretion of the trial
judge on a motion for new trial. They see and hear the
witnesses and frequently, as in this case, see the injury and

)
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the impairmp-nt that has resulted therefrom. As a result,
all presumptions are in favor of the decision of the trial
court (McOhristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal.App.2d 249, 263 [171
P.2d 85]). [8] The power of the appellate court differs
materially from that of the trial court in passing on this
question. An appellate court can interfere on the ground that
the judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict
is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and
suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the
jury. The proper rule was stated in Holmes v. Southern Cal.
Edison 00., 78 Cal.App.2d 43, 51 [177 P.2d 32], as follows:
"The powers and duties of a trial judge in ruling on a motion
for new trial and of an appellate court on an appeal from
a judgment are very different when the question of an excessive award of damages arises. The trial judge sits as a
thirteenth juror with the power to weigh the evidence and
judge the credibility of the witnesses. If he believes the damages awarded by the jury to be excessive and the question is
presented it becomes his duty to reduce them. [Citing cases.]
When the question is raised his denial of a motion for new
trial is an indication that he approves the amount of the
award. An appellate court has no such po,vers. It cannot
weigh the evidence and pass on the credibility of the witnesses
as a juror does. To hold an award excessive it must be so
large as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the
jurors." In Holder v. Key System, 88 Cal.App.2d 925, 940
[200 P.2d 98], the court, after quoting the above from the
Holmes case added: "The question is not what this court
would have awarded as the trier of the fact, but whether
this court can say that the award is so high as to suggest
passion or prejudice." In Wilson v. Fitch, 41 Cal. 363, 386,
decided in 1871, there appears the oft-quoted statement that:
•• The Court will not interfere in such cases unless the amount
awarded is so grossly excessive as to shock the moral sense,
and raise a reasonable presumption that the jury was under
the influence of passion or prejudice. In this case, whilst the
sum awarded appears to be much larger than the facts
demanded, the amount cannot be said to be so grossly excessive as to be reasonably imputed only to passion or prejudice
in the jury. In such cases there is no accurate standard by
which to compute the injury, and the jury must., necessarily,
be left to the exercise of a wide discretion; to be restricted by
the Court only when the sum awarded is so large that the
verdict shocks the moral sense, and raises a presumption that

)
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it must havc proceeded from passion or prejudice." This
same rule was announced in Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal.2d 54,
76 [181 P.2d 645], where it was stated that it "is not the
function of a reviewing court to interfere with a jury's award
of damages unless it is so grossly disproportionate to any
reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the facts that
it shocks the court's sense of justice and raises a presumption
that it was the result of passion and prejudice." (See also
Connolly v. Pre-Mixed Conc1'efe Co.,49 Cal.2d 483, 488 [319
P.2d 343] ; Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal.2d 343,
359 [282 P.2d 23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107]; Zibbell v. Southern
Pacific Co., 160 Cal. 237, 255 [116 P. 513].)
[9] There are no fixed or absolute standards by which
an appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent
of the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the
wrongful act of the defendant. The duty of an appellate
court is to uphold the jury and trial judge whenever possible.
(Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 192
[25 P.2d 839, 91 A.L.R. 1357].) The amount to be awarded
is "a matter on which there legitimately may be a wide difference of opinion" (Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal.2d 820,823 [172
P.2d 353]). In considering the contention that the damages
are excessive the appellate court must determine every conflict in the evidence in respondent's favor, and must give him
the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from the
record (Kimic v. San Jose-Los Gatos etc. Ry. Co., 156 Cal.
273,277 [104 P. 312]).
[ 10] While the appellate court should consider the
amounts awarded in prior cases for similar injuries, obviously,
each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Such examination demonstrates that such awards vary greatly. (See exhaustive annotations in 16 A.L.R.2d 3, and 16
A.L.R.2d 393.) Injuries are seldom identical and the amount
of pain and suffering involved in similar physical injuries
varies widely. These factors must be considered. (Leming v.
Oilfields Trucking Co., supra, 44 Ca1.2d 343, 356; Crane v.
Smith, 23 Cal.2d 288, 302 [144 P.2d 356].) Basically, the
question that should be decided by the appellate courts is
whether or not the verdict is so out of line with reason that
it shocks the conscience and necessarily implies that the
verdict must have been the result of passion and prejudice.
[11] In the instant case, the nonpecuniary items of damage include allowances for pain and suffering, past and future,
humiliation as a result of being disfigured and being per-

lI
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manently crippled, and constant anxiety and fear that the
leg will have to be amputated. While the amount of the award
is high, and may be more than we would have awarded were
we the trier of the facts, considering the nature of the injury,
t.he great pain and suffering, past and future, and the other
. items of damage, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that it
is so high that it shocks the conscience and gives rise to the
presumption that it was the result of passion or prejudice on
the part of the jurors.
[12] Defendants next complain that it was prejudicial
error for plaintiff's counsel to argue to the jury that damages
for pain and suffering could be fixed by means of a mathematical formula predicated upon a per diem allowance for
this item of damages. The propriety of such an argument
seems never to have been passed upon in this state. In other
jurisdictions there is a sharp divergence of opinion on the
subject. (See anno., 60 A.L.R.2d 1331.) It is not necessary
to pass on the propriety of such argument in the instant case
because, when plaintiff's counsel made the argument in question, defendants' counsel did not object, assign it as misconduct or ask that the jury be admonished to disregard it.
Moreover, in his argument to the jury, the defendants' counsel
also adopted a mathematical formula type of argument. This
being so, even if such argument were error (a point we do not
pass upon), the point must be deemed to have been waived,
and cannot be raised, properly, on appeal. (State Rubbish etc.
Assn. v. Silunoff. 38 Cal.2d 330, 340 [240 P.2d 282].)
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Although I agree that there was no prejudicial error on
the issue of liability, it is my opinion that the award of
$134,000 for pain and suffering is so excessive as to indicate
that it was prompted by passion, prejudice, whim, or caprice. 1
Before the accident plaintiff was employed as a file clerk
'The award of $53,903.i5 for pecuniary loss, past and future, is also
8Uspect. The amount awarded for future medical expenses is $12,196.25
greater than the medical expenses incurred from the time of the accident
to the time of trial, a period of nearly two years. The amount awarded
for future loss of earnings is $4,500 greater than plaintiff's past 10s8
of earnings. Yet· the evidence indicates that plaintiff's medical care
bas been largely complcted and tbat the future loss of earnings will not
exceed tbe earnings lost by tbe prolonged stays in the hospital and tho
rehabilitation center.
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at a salary of $375 a month. At the time of the trial she had
returned to her job at the same salary and her foot had
healed sufficiently for her to walle At the time of the accident
she was 42 years old with a life expectancy of 34.9 years.
During closing argument plaintiff's counsel summarized thc
evidence relevant to past and possible future damages and
proposed a specific amount for each item. His total of
$187,903.75 was the exact amount awarded by the jury.
His proposed amounts were as follows:
Doctor and Hospital Bills .......... $10,330.50
Drugs and other medical expenses
stipulated to in the amount of. . . . 2,273.25
Loss of earnings from time of
accident to time of trial. . . . . . . . . . 5,500.00 $ 18,103.75
l"uture Medical Expenses:
$2,000 per year for next ten years 20,000.00
$200 per year for the 24 years
thereafter ...................• 4,800.00
Drugs for 34 years. . • . . . . . .. . . . . • 1,000.00
Possible future loss of earnings ..•••
Total Pecuniary Loss ..•.......••••
Pain and Suffering:
From time of accident to time of
trial (660 days) @ $100 a day. . .. 66,000.00
For the remainder of her life
(34 years) @ $2,000 a year. . . . . .• 68,000.00
Total proposed by counsel. ........•

25,800.00
43,903.75
10,000.00
53,903.75

134,000.00
$187,903.75

The jury and the trial court have broad discretion in
determining the damages in a personal injury case. (Johll$ton
v. Long, 30 Ca1.2d 54, 76 [181 P.2d 645] ; Roedder v. Rowley,
28 Ca1.2d 820,823 [172 P.2d 353].) A reviewing court, however, has responsibilities not only to the litigants in an action
but to future litigants and must reverse or remit when a jury
awards either inadequate or excessive damages. (E.g., Clifford
v. Ruocco, 39 Ca1.2d 327, 329 [246 P.2d 651] [inadequate
award] ; Torr v. United Railroads, 187 Cal. 505, 509 [202 P.
671] [inadequate award]; Ckinnis v. POllwna Pump Co.,
36 Cal.App.2d 633,642-643 [98 P.2d 560] [inadequate award] ;
Bellman v. Sall Francisco H. S. Dist., 11 Ca1.2d 576, 588 [81
P.2d 894] [excessive award] ; Mondine v. Sarlill, 11 Ca1.2d
593,600 [81 P.2d 903] [excessive award] ; Lindemann v. San
Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 5 Ca1.2d 480,510 [55 P.2d 870] [exces-
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sive award] ; Phelps v. Cogswell, 70 Cal. 201,204 [11 P. 628]
[excessive award].)
The crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the
. award of $134.000 for pain and suffering is so excessive it
must.have resulted from passion, prejudice, whim or caprice.
"To say that a verdict has been influenced by passion or
prejudice is but another way of saying that the verdict exceeds
any amount justified by the evidence." (Z,obell v. Southern
Pacific Co., 160 Cal. 237, 254 [116 P. 513]; see Doolin v.
Omntous Cable Co., 125 Cal. 141,144 [57 P. 774].)
There has been forceful criticism of the .rationale for
awarding damages for pain and suffering in negligence cases.
(Morris, Liability for Pain and S·uf/ering, 59 Columb.L.Rev.
476; Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Ohio L.J.
200; Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of
Insurance, 18 Law and Contemporary Problems 219; Zelermyel', Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 Syracuse L.Rev.
27.) Such damages originated under primitive law as a
means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings
of those who had been wronged. (Morris, Liability for Pain
and Suffering, supra, 59 Columb.L.Rev. at p. 478; Jaffe,
Damages for Personal bljUry: The Impact of Insurance,
supra, 18 Law and Contemporary Problems at pp. 222-223.)
They become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a
mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods
or of transportation. mtimately such losses are borne by a
public free of fault as part of the price for the benefits of
mechanization. (Cf. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Ca1.2d
339, 347-848 [5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575] ; Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., a2 N.J. 358 [161 A.2d 69, 77, 75
A.L.R.2d 1]; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d
453, 462 [150 P .2d 436] [concurring opinion] .)
Nonetheless. this state has long recognized pain and suBering as elements of damages in negligence cases (Zibbell v.
Southern Pacific Co., supra, 160 Cal. 237, 250; Roedder v.
Rowley, supra, 28 Ca1.2d 820, 822) ; any change in this regard
must await reexamination of the pl'oblem by the Legislature.
Meanwhile, awards for pain and suffering serve to ease plain.
tiffs' discomfort and to pay for attorney fees for which plaintiffs are not otherwise compensated.
It would hardly be possible ever to compensate a person
fully for pain and suffering. "'No rational being would
. change places with the injured man for an amount of gold
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that would fill the room of the court, yet no lawyer would
contend that such is the legal measure of damages.' " (ZibbeU
.v. Soufkern Pacific Co., supra, 160 Cal. 237, 255; see 2 Harper
and James, The Law of Torts 1322.) "Translating pain and
. anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowimce,and not a process of measurement, and consequently the
judge can, in his instructions give the jury no standard to go
by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in their
discretion they may consider reasonable. • . • The chief reliance for reaching reasonable results in attempting to value
suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common
sense of the jury..•. " (McCormick, Damages, § 88, pp. 318319.) Such restraint and common sense were lacking here.
A review of reported cases involving serious injuries and
large pecuniary losses reveals that ordinarily the part of the
verdict attributable to pain and suffering does not exceed
the part attributable to pecuniary losses. (See 16 A.L.R.2d
3-390; 18 West Cal.Dig., Damages, §§ 130-132.) The award
in this case of $134,000 for pain and suffering exceeds not
only the pecuniary losses but any such award heretofore sustained in this state even in cases involving injuries more
serious by far than those suffered by plaintiff. (See Leming v.
Oilfields Trucking Co. (1955), 44 Cal.2d 343, 358 [282 P.2d
23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107]; Deshotel v. Atchison, T. " S. P. By.
Co. (1956),144 Cal.App.2d 224,231 [300 P.2d 910] ; McNuZty
v. Soutkern Pacific Co. (1950), 96 Cal.App.2d 841, 847 [216
P.2d 534] discussed in Kalven, The Jury and The Damage
Award,19 Ohio L.J. 158, 170; Sullivan v. City" County of
San Prancisco (1950), 95 CaJ.App.2d 745, 758-761 [214 P.2d
82]; Gluckstein v. Lipsett (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 391, 398
[209 P.2d 98] ; Huggans v. Southern Pacific Co. (1949), 92
Cal.App.2d 599, 615 [207 P.2d 864].) In McNulty v. Southern
Pacific Co., supra, the court reviewed a large number of eases
involving injuries to legs and feet, in each of which the total
judgment, including both pecuniary loss and pain and suffering did not exceed $100,000.2 Although excessive damages is
"an issue which is primarily factual and is not therefore a
matter which can be decided upon the basis of awards made
in other cases" (Leming v. Oilfields Trucking 00., 44 Ca1.2d
343, 356 [282 P.2d 23, 51 A.L.R.2d 107]; Ortme v. Smith,
23 Ca1.2d 288, 302 [144 P.2d 356]), awards for sim.nar in-rile verdicta ill lOme of these ca8es were over .100,000 IMat ID -.ch
eaae the awant wu reduced to 1100,000 or 1-.
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juries may be considered as one factor to be weighed in
determining whether the damages awarded are excessive.
(Maede v. Oakland High School Dist., 212 Cal. 419, 425 [298
P. 987] ; McNulty v. Southern Pacific 00., supra, 96 Cal.App.
2d 841, 848.)
The excessive award in this case was undoubtedly the result
of the improper argument of plaintiff's counsel to the jury.
Though no evidence was introduced, though none could possibly be introduced on the monetary value of plaintiff's suffering, counsel urged the jury to award $100 a day for pain and
suffering from the time of the accident to the time of trial
and $2,000 a year for pain and suffering for the remainder
of plaintiff's life.
The propriety of counsel's proposing a specific sum for each
day or month of suffering has recently been considered by
courts of several jurisdictions. (See 19 Ohio L.J. 780; 33
So.Cal.L.Rev. 214, 216.) The reasons for and against permitting "per diem argument for pain and suffering" are reviewed in Ratner v. Arrington (Fla.App.). 111 So.2d 82, 85-90
[1959 Florida decision holding such argument is permissible]
and Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82 [138 A.2d 713, 718-725, 60
A.L.R.2d 1331] [1958 New Jersey decision holding such argument to be an "unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the
jury"].
The reason usually advanced for not allowing such argument is that since there is no way of translating pain and
suffering into monetary terms, counsel's proposal of a particular sum for each day of suffering represents an opinion and a
conclusion on matters not disclosed by the evidence, and tends
to mislead the jury and result in excessive awards. The reason
usually advanced for allowing "per diem argument for pain
and suffering" is that it affords the jury as good an arbitrary
measure as any for that which cannot be measured.
Counsel may argue all legitimate inferences from the evidence, but he may not employ arguments that tend primarily
to mislead the jury. (People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 886
[346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Johnson, 178 Cal.App.2d 360, 372
[3 Cal.Rptr. 28] ; Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport
Oorp., 11 Wis.2d 604 [106 N.W.2d 274, 280] ; Michael and
Adler, Trial of an Iss1w of Fact, 34 Columb.L.Rev. 1224, 14831484; cf. Rogers v. Fopp ia 110, 23 Cal.App.2d 87, 94-95 [72
P .2d 239].) A specified sum for pain and suffering for any
particular period is bound to be conjectural. Positing such a
sum for a small period of time and then multiplying that sum
Ie C.M-IT

